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THE COURT: I understand, but Mr. Ayres, you purport to
represent the public?
MR. AYRES: Certainly that is true.
THE COURT: And the EPA purports to represent the public?
MR. AYRES: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And the Department of Justice represents the
public, and TVA is a public agency. The Tennessee Cooperative
Association represents the public users of power in the Tennessee
Valley. All of you tell me where the real adversity is. It is citizen
against citizen here, and they are the same people. That is why
I am saying this is not a normal type of adversarial relationship.
843
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MR. AYRES: You are certainly correct that each of the parties purports to represent the public. I don't think that is particularly important. The point is that each of them had a different
perception of what the public interest is.
THE COURT: Yes, sir. And I suppose it is my responsibility
to try to resolve those.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal corporation,
is the nation's largest electric utility. It operates twelve coal-fired
steam plants in Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee. In 1977 the
sulfur dioxide emissions (SO 2 ) from these plants exceeded two
million tons a year, making TVA the worst SO 2 polluter in the
country.2 In 1977 ten citizens' organizations, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the states of Alabama
and Kentucky sued TVA for its failure to comply with the governing provisions of the federal Clean Air Act.'
In his article, Public Law and Public Power: The TVA Air Pollution Conflict,4 Keith Casto reconstructs a history of the legal controversy surrounding TVA's experiences with the Clean Air Act.
As Casto shows, the cynosure of the conflict was the citizens' enforcement litigation, which was designed to compel TVA to comply
with the commands of Congress embodied in the Clean Air Act.
But the dispute also illuminated a more encompassing theme: the
relationship between citizens' advocacy and institutional reform.
It is in this relationship that many of the troubling paradoxes of
public law advocacy are revealed. Through this larger prism, the
TVA dispute sharply highlights fundamental questions about the
efficacy and legitimacy of government regulation, interest group
advocacy, and the role of the judiciary in complex enforcement
*A. B., Hamilton College; J. D., Vanderbilt University; Associate Professor
of Law, University of Tennessee. The author was co-counsel for the citizens'
organizations in the litigation discussed in this article. This article benefited from
careful readings by Richard Ayres, Keith Casto, Susan Kovac, Neil McBride, Nicole
Russler, and Douglas Wickham. The views expressed in the article are solely
those of the author.
1. Official Transcript of Proceedings, Tennessee Thoracic Society v.
Freeman, No. 77-3286 and consolidated cases (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 1979).
2. The total emissions from TVA steam plants constituted 380/o of the
total SO 2 emissions in the southeast and 16% nationally. Complaint, 24, Tennessee Thoracic Society v. Freeman, No. 77-3286 and consolidated cases (M.D.
Tenn. June 22, 1977).
3. Tennessee Thoracic Society v. Freeman, No. 77-3286 (M.D. Tenn. June
22, 1977). See 42 U.S.C. S 7401-7646 (Supp. IV 1980).
4. Within this Symposium.
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litigation.5 The overarching issue, posed so well in the dialogue
quoted above between the federal judge hearing the case and one
of the citizen lawyers, is the elusive character of what it means
to be pursuing the public interest -whether as an agency, a private
organization, a lawyer, or a court.'
It would be easy to portray this episode as a parable of
democratic failure and redemption, of good versus bad. It is difficult to resist such simplistic characterizations, and some have
undoubtedly crept into this piece. Writing about events one is part
of is an exceedingly risky, critical enterprise. The advocate's
predisposition toward rationalization often beclouds honest, open
analysis.' On the other hand, without the intimacy of
participation -the subjective feel of the flow of events-accounts
of litigation tend to be impoverished. In conjunction with its companion piece, this essay represents an attempt to reconstruct the
complex of decisions, circumstances, ideas, values and relationships
that propelled this controversy. It also is a limited attempt to provide a phenomenology of the advocacy that comprised this episode.8
5. Public Law or institutional reform litigation has spawned a burgeoning literature. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and Extraordinary in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Fletcher,
The DiscretionaryConstitution: InstitutionalRemedies and Judicial Legitimacy,
91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977);
Wilton, Functional Interest Advocacy in Modern Complex Litigation, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 37 (1982); Special Project, The Remedial Process in InstitutionalReform
Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978); Note, JudicialIntervention and Organization Theory: Changing BureaucraticBehavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980).
A consistent theme in this literature is an attempt to reconcile this type of litigation with received democratic values. The TVA conflict compounds this search
because of the intra- and intergovernmental nature of the dispute and the special
institutional features of TVA.
6. The concept of the "public interest" has eluded theoretical consensus.
See Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis,
in B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER & N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 4-29 (1978).
Because of its imprecision, the term is frequently used in legal and political
discourse. See generally V. HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
(1970).
7. This observation was made in a slightly different way in a symposium
on legal scholarship:
[W]hen one practices advocacy in a self-conscious manner for a long time,
the experience, like any extended experience of this sort, is likely to
affect what one cares about. Our cares reflect our habits . . . and the
habitual indifference to truth that the advocate must cultivate in his professional life is likely to promote what is perhaps best understood, in
a literal sense, as a kind of carelessness about the truth.
Kronman, Foreward:Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955,
965 (1981).
8. Self-reflective accounts of litigation could help leaven the anti-empirical
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Part II of this essay will sketch the major regulatory problems
underlying the control of SO 2 pollution, the major issue in the TVA
dispute.' Part III will focus on the major actors and interests in
the dispute by constructing a political and historical framework
through which the litigation can be understood. The succeeding
sections will describe and assess the strategies and issues in the
litigation and negotiation. Finally, the piece will conclude with
lessons and generalizations about public advocacy and institutional
reform.
II.

THE ISSUE: S02, TALL STACKS, AND THE LAW

Devising policies to control SO 2 pollution has bedeviled
legislators, regulators, and courts since the first federal air pollution efforts were undertaken in 1963.11 Tracing the intricate legal
and administrative framework for control of SO 2 pollution from
stationary sources is beyond the scope of this article." There are

tendency that pervades much legal scholarship. It has been recognized that such
accounts would enrich our understanding of the connection between law practice
and legal theory. Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism,Hermeneutics and Legal
Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena,
36 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. - (1982) (forthcoming); see Simon, Homo Psychologicus:
Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487, 558-59 (1980); Note, 'Round
and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to CriticalLegal Scholarship,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1686-88 (1982). Useful case studies of litigation by participant observers exist. See Berger, Away From the Court House and Into the Field:
The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978); Gilhool, The Uses
of Courts and Lawyers, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE
MENTALLY RETARDED 155 (1976). In preparing a piece of this kind, the lawyer must
keep a systematic diary of the day-to-day course of the case. In the TVA litigation I attempted to keep a personal record of the strategies, theories, and events
of the case. In this article I have drawn heavily on the facts and impressions
contained in that record.
9. This article will not separately address TVA's experience with control
of particulate emissions from its coal-fired plants because of the inextricable relationship between control of particulates and SO 2 . Suffice it to say that the TVA
Board took more interest in the control of particulate emissions (perhaps because
of their high visibility), but the staff, following a different agenda, failed adequately to respond to the Board's concerns. As an excellent case study of TVA's
air pollution policies concluded: "Indeed, if the organizational structure had
responded more energetically to the board's desire to install good particulate
controls, TVA might not have been caught so unprepared for the state standards
when they were established in 1972." M. ROBERTS & J. BLUHM. THE CHOICES OF
POWER 109 (1981).
10. Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (formerly codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1857-18571) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7646 (Supp. IV
1980)).
11. For a thorough analysis of the law governing control of pollution from
stationary sources, see Ayres, Enforcement of Air PollutionControls on Stationary
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certain key features of the regulatory effort to control S02,
however, that are particularly relevant to the TVA controversy.
Three stand out.
First, in formulating policies to control S02 pollution, EPA,
from its creation in 1970, was under enormous pressure. The young
agency was laboring under exceptionally short time frames
established by Congress, relying on data whose scientific adequacy
was arguable, and coordinating with states whose commitment to
and expertise in pollution control was questionable. 2 The agency
was also operating within the confines of a statute that gave the
agency, states, and polluters sparse guidance on how to treat questions involving the economic and technological feasibility of achieving the desired levels of control."3
Against this background, it is little wonder that EPA vacillated
in the early 1970's on the permissibility of intermittent control
systems to reduce SO 2 pollution from stationary sources. 4 Because
of EPA's early hesitation to compel polluters to install constant
control technology (e.g., scrubbers) on existing sources, polluters
faced a rational choice: either spend money and comply with the
applicable requirements, knowing that the possibility existed that
intermittent controls might ultimately be allowed, or delay and
Sources under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 441 (1975); Currie, Direct Federal Regulation of Stationary Sources under the Clean Air Act, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 1389 (1980). Several recent studies have examined a discrete segment of SO 2 policymaking, the formulation of new source performance standards
(NSPS) for coal-fired plants. B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
(1981); E. HASKELL. THE POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR (1982). See also Sierra Club v. Costie, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA's regulations for new coal-fired
steam plants). For a thoughtful case study of the development of policy to control emissions from motor vehicles, see J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND
POLICY (1977).
12. See Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 267 (J. Wilson ed. 1980). For a revealing inside account, see J. QUARLES,
CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY (1976).

13. Issues of economic and technical feasibility ultimately were resolved
by the courts. See Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasibilityin Clean Air Act
Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89 HARV. L. REV. 316 (1975).
14. Intermittent control systems include dispersion enhancement of pollution through tall stacks or use of gas heaters to boost emissions to higher altitudes,
staggering hours of operation at a particular facility, or weather prediction. Intermittent control systems are distinguished from constant emission controls that
remove pollution before it is emitted into the atmosphere. Flue gas desulfurization systems (scrubber) or low sulfur coal are examples of constant control
strategies. Polluters were required to develop control strategies to meet emission limitations established under S l10(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. IV 1980)). For a helpful
discussion of the distinction between intermittent and constant control systems,
see W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.8, at 254-59 (1977).

848

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

risk administrative or legal action by EPA and the states. 5 Given
this choice, many polluters, including TVA, chose to resist, hoping
that the eventual judicial resolution of this question would be resolved in favor of intermittent controls."6
Second, as knowledge was gained about the problems of S0 2
pollution during the 1970's, concerns arose that EPA's original approach to SO 2 pollution was misconceived. This approach, which
regulated ambient air quality close to pollution sources, failed to
consider the transformation of SO 2 pollution in the atmosphere
into sulfates or acid rain." These pollutants are often dispersed
hundreds of miles from their place of origin and, according to many
studies, cause severe health and environmental problems. 8 As more
data on this phenomenon were generated, it became clear that,
from a political perspective, the problem was a difficult one. The
prospect of interregional conflict posed by the acid rain problem
severely strained the ability of EPA to deal decisively with the
mounting evidence on this question. 9
While shedding doubt on the adequacy of the existing
regulatory approach to S02 pollution, evolving technical knowledge
in the 1970's confirmed that Congress and EPA were correct in
condemning intermittent control systems (e.g., tall stacks) and en15. For a discussion of this variation of the "moving target" phenomenon
in regulation, see Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1271-72 (1981). See also S. BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 267-69 (1982) (explanation of why few incentives to
voluntary compliance with specific pollution standards exist).
16. As it turned out, courts uniformly held that intermittent controls conflicted with Congress' intention to control pollution before it was emitted into
the atmosphere. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.
1975); Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
421 U.S. 60 (1975).
17. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supranote 10, at 60-65; Pederson, Why
The Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1981).
18. The data on damage to the environment from acid rain and to human
health from sulfates are mounting. See L. LAVE & E. SESKIN, AIR POLLUTION AND
HUMAN HEALTH (1977); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY, To BREATHE CLEAN
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ATMOSPHERE-BIOSPHERE INTERACTIONS: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FOSSIL FUEL COMBUSTION (1981) (superceding earlier report, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SULFUR OXIDES (1978)). The competing issues in the debate
over sulfates are recounted in R. TOBIN, THE SOCIAL GAMBLE: DETERMINING
ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF AIR QUALITY 127-53 (1979).

AIR 237-53 (1981);

19. A good example of interregional conflict is New York's recent opposition to a relaxation of the emission limitation at TVA's Kingston Steam Plant
on the ground that the plant's emissions contribute to acid rain damage in New
York. 46 Fed. Reg. 61,120 (1981). Subsequently, New York sued EPA over the
Kingston relaxation. New York v. Gorsuch, No. 82-3126 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1982).
TVA has intervened as a defendant in the case.
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couraging scrubber and coal washing systems for removing SO 2
before its release into the atmosphere. Throughout the late 1960's
and early 1970's, affected industries, often flaunting TVA data,
argued that scrubber systems were unreliable, unnecessarily costly,
and, because of the system's sludge by-product, harmful to the
environment.2 ' Despite encouragement by EPA, relatively few companies installed scrubbers in the early 1970's. Most companies, including TVA, resisted use of these control systems, continuing instead to advocate tall stacks as the most economical approach to
the achievement of national health standards. By the early 1980's,
there was considerable evidence that such resistance was
technologically and economically unfounded."1 This evidence has
vindicated Congress's initial common sense intuition that tall stacks
were environmentally unsound and alternative systems were feasible. Throughout the running debate, however, the regulatory
scheme remained largely unchanged, and many polluters, their
arsenal of arguments largely exhausted, found themselves unprepared to meet the emission limitations established by the Act.
Finally, the question of enforcement remained. Under the
regulatory approach of the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act, enforcement was to proceed on a case-by-case basis initiated
either by EPA, a state enforcement agency, or citizens.22 The
responsibility for enforcement ultimately devolved on the courts,
whose competence to deal with the sometimes complex technical,
scientific, and economic questions presented by air pollution was
largely unproven.
Until the 1977 Amendments, a major flaw in the Clean Air Act's
enforcement scheme was the ability of polluters to gain economic
benefit from resistance and delay. For polluters intent on stalling,
the judicial enforcement proceedings provided numerous opportunities to delay the day of reckoning. The economic advantage
to delay often tipped the cost-benefit calculations, particularly for
large polluters, in favor of resistance. 3
The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act attempted to rectify this problem by requiring EPA to recapture through a penalty
the economic value of noncompliance gained by polluters who
resisted timely compliance.24 This potent enforcement tool, however,
has not been effective so far. EPA has moved slowly to implement
this section of the Act in the face of delaying industry litigation.
20. See TOBIN, supra note 18, at 110-11.
21. INFORM, THE SCRUBBER STRATEGY (1982).
22. For a summary of enforcement mechanisms under the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, see W. RODGERS, supra note 14, S 3.19, at 336-53.
23. See Note, DeterringAir Polluters Through Economically Efficient Sanctions: A Proposalfor Amending the Clean Air Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1980).
24. Section 120, 42 U.S.C. 5 7422 (Supp. IV 1980).
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The prospect of a huge court-ordered penalty against a local utility or industry has also dimmed the administration's zeal in
deploying this sanction.
These features of the regulatory framework for SO 2 control
illustrate the general legal and policy complexities involved in the
TVA controversy. What these features do not reveal is the unusual
nature of a controversy whose centerpiece was an agency of the
federal government. Had TVA simply been a large utility, it is
doubtful that this episode would have achieved the notoriety it
did. To understand the lasting significance of this struggle, it is
necessary to examine both the institutions and people who were
involved.
III.

THE INTERESTS

The usual justification for the regulation of private businesses
by administrative agencies is the necessity of ensuring that their
operations shall not conflict with the public interest. In the case
of a public business, however, such an enterprise itself is no less
obligated to serve the public interest in accordance with law than
is the regulatory agency: hence the effect of such regulation is
almost certain to be simply to duplicate management and to dilute
responsibility.25

A.

TVA

The TVA is a peculiar governmental entity. Founded in 1933,
the agency was conceived as a counterpoint to the centralization
of government functions in Washington, D.C., that took place during the New Deal. 6 Through the years, TVA has enjoyed considerable latitude in pursuing its multi-purpose objectives under
an unusually expansive legislative charter. The agency's insulation from normal political controls and intrusive judicial review
was firmly established in its early years, a prerogative the agency
has jealously guarded."

25. Lilienthal & Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprisesby the Federal
Government, 54 HARV. L. REV. 545, 575 (1941). Robert Marquis, a member of TVA's
legal staff in 1941, was TVA's General Counsel from 1967-1975.
26. The literature on TVA's early years is quite large. See generally T.
McGRAw, TVA AND THE POWER FIGHT 1933-39 (1971); TVA, THE FIRST TWENTY
YEARS: A STAFF REPORT (R. Martin ed. 1956); C. PRITCHETT, THE TENNESSEE
VALLEY AUTHORITY (1943).
27. For analyses of TVA's organic statute, see Wirtz, The Legal Framework
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 TENN. L. REV. 573 (1976); Comment, TVA 's
Statutory Authority To Promote Energy Conservation, 44 TENN. L. REV. 845 (1977).
28. See Rivkin, TVA, The Courts, and the Public Interest, in TVA: THE
LEGACIES OF HISTORY (E. Hargrove & P. Conklin eds. 1983) (forthcoming).
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TVA's Institutional Self-Image

Until the 1970's, TVA was singularly successful in portraying
its institutional image in flattering democratic terms. A synthesis
of the agency's self-image provides a useful backdrop for understanding its motivations in the air pollution controversy. Accounts
of TVA by former TVA officials and uncritical proponents of the
agency paint the following picture.29
In its early years TVA brought electric power and nascent prosperity to remote areas of an underdeveloped region. It succeeded
in this task of revitalization by basing its decisions on the best
professional expertise available. In order to identify goals and
priorities, the agency relied on close contacts with local officials
and other "grassroots" entities. Its decisions were in the public
interest because they represented the collective aspirations of the
majority of people in the Tennessee Valley and the nation.
The agency vigorously safeguarded its mission from outside
challenge. In its early years private power interests represented
the greatest threat to the achievement of TVA's goals." Other
federal agencies, notably the Department of Interior, also
threatened to usurp TVA's autonomy." These attempts to encroach
on TVA's independence were decisively quelled through the skillful
political and legal efforts of the TVA leadership and legal staff.
While continuing its economic development efforts in the region,
TVA expertise was also channeled to a more pressing purpose:
the nation's national security effort. During World War II and the
Korean War, TVA power plants supplied electricity for firms
manufacturing vital aluminum and other needed war supplies and
critical federal installations (for example, the Manhattan Project).
After World War II, TVA constructed additional generating capacity to drive Atomic Energy Commission facilities.
In the 1950's TVA adopted a new institutional mission consistent with its early regional development efforts: the provision of
abundant low-cost power. This goal motivated the agency through
29. See, e.g., G. CLAPP, THE TVA (1955); D. LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY
ON THE MARCH (1944); M. OWEN, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (1973).

30. For an account of the early legal struggles between TVA and private
power interests, see Swidler & Marquis, TVA in Court: A Study of TVA 's Constitutional Litigation, 32 IOWA L. REV. 296 (1947).
31. There was bitter in-fighting between David Lilienthal and Harold Ickes.
1 D. LILIENTHAL, THE JOURNALS OF DAVID LILIENTHAL: THE TVA YEARS 1939-45,
126-38 (1964).
32. Public power advocates responded to the attacks by private utility interests, who saw TVA as a "malignant socialist cyst on the body politic," by replying "that there is nothing socialistic in providing a little competition to protect
the helpless consumer against these rapacious monopolies." A. WILDAVSKY,
DIXON-YATES: A STUDY IN POWER POLITICS 9 (1962).
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the 1970's. Institutional resources were devoted to achieving this
goal, which stimulated the Valley's economy and made life easier
for its people.
2.

The Critique of TVA's Institutional Image

In its early years TVA mobilized a powerful constituency to
promote its institutional freedom. TVA's allies in the executive
branch, Congress, regional and local government, and, later, in industry formed an influential elite. At the time, it was inconceivable
that any constituency would criticize TVA's role in regional development or the national security effort except for purely private ends.'
With this buffer protecting it, TVA grew into an institution whose
impregnability exceeded that of most of its New Deal counterparts.
Criticism of the agency appeared as TVA grew in size. This
criticism focused on the tension between TVA's avowed democratic
goals and its ponderous bureaucratic methods.' Three elements
of this criticism, which spanned into the 1970's, deserve comment.
a.

TVA's Lack of Accountability

Despite the agency's rhetoric about its accountability and
responsiveness, perhaps best embodied in TVA: Democracy on the
March by David Lilienthal, TVA's chairman from 1941 to 1946,
critics of TVA charged that the agency was too remote and slowmoving to respond flexibly to the varied needs of the region. The
large size of TVA, relative to other governmental entities in the
region, contributed to this stodgy bureaucratic image. More importantly, the agency was accused of manipulating democratic decisionmaking by "coopting" local officials and groups and guiding
them toward the agency's predetermined objectives.34
The agency also failed to develop procedures for ensuring open
decisionmaking. Adroitly shifting between its roles as public agency
and private business enterprise, TVA resisted trends toward
responsive decisionmaking that were reshaping administrative

33. For formative criticism of TVA, see, e.g., D. DAVIDSON, 2 THE TENNESSEE 226-72, 306-36 (1948); E. ROBERTS, ONE RIVER-SEVEN STATES (1955); P.
SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASSROOTS (1949). For more modern criticism of the agency, see, e.g., V. HOBDAY, SPARKS AT THE GRASSROOTS: MUNICIPAL DISTRIBUTION
OF TVA ELECTRICITY IN TENNESSEE (1969); Barnes, A Mixed Blessing: TVA After
40 Years, NEW REPUBLIC 16 (Nov. 10, 1973); Branscome, TVA-It Ain't What It Used
to Be, AMERICAN HERITAGE 69 (Nov. 1977); Shapley, TVA Today: FormerReformers
in an Era of Expensive Electricity, 194 ScI. 814 (1976).
34. The concept of institutional "cooptation" was first elaborated in P.
SELZNICK, supra note 33, at 13. Selznick also detailed the difficulties of reconciling
democratic procedures with long-term government planning. Id. at 13-16.
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agencies in the 1960's and 1970's.35 In many respects, including its
failure to hold open board meetings," its grudging disclosure of
agency data, and its resistance to formal channels of participation
in and appeal of major policy decisions, the agency acted like a
private corporation. The agency's substantive decisions were
criticized in part because the process by which they were reached
was suspect. This closed character was reinforced by Congress and
the courts, which insulated TVA decisions from meaningful review.
b.

TVA's Technocratic Decisionmaking

TVA policies were exceptionally difficult to challenge because
of the agency's overwhelming reservoir of technical expertise. When
deciding whether a particular generating plant should be constructed at a certain location, TVA could marshal an impressive
array of opinions from engineers, scientists, and lawyers justifying the agency's choice. These experts inevitably couched their
opinions in neutral, technical language, which often masked the
serious political, distributional, and ethical choices that were
involved. 8 Expert opinion was equated with democratic results,
and those who challenged agency policy were destined to become
frustrated.39
c.

TVA's Arrogation of the Public Interest

As a planning and development agency, TVA has always promoted its own conception of the public interest. Agency decisions
were justified on the grounds that they benefited the largest
number of TVA consumers, even though some suffered (for example, persons displaced from their homes by TVA projects). TVA
claimed to keep its pulse on the preferences of the people, to ag35. See generally J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY (1978); Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
36. Under pressure from certain members of the press and Congress, TVA
held its first open Board meeting in 1975, two years before enactment of the
Federal Government Sunshine Act. 5 U.S.C. S 552b (1976).
37. For example, President Reagan's transition team noted: "TVA's efforts
to increase public participation have involved more form than substance. They
are flawed in execution and concept." TVA Transition Team, President-Elect
Reagan Transition Team Report on Tennessee Valley Authority 9 (Jan. 15, 1981).
38. For a general study critical of technocratic decisionmaking, see P.
SELF. ECONOCRATS AND THE POLICY PROCESS: THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1975).

39. For the disillusioning saga of the opponents of TVA's Tellico Dam, see
Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case,
within this Symposium; Wheeler & McDonald, TVA, Its "New Mission" and the
Tellico Project, 1945-1970, in Hargrove, supra note 28.
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gregate these preferences, and to develop policy on this seemingly
solid utilitarian and majoritarian foundation.0
The agency, however, refused to acknowledge its own role
in shaping the preferences of the citizens in the Valley.41 Using
its formidable resources to disseminate information on issues and
policies, TVA undoubtedly shaped the views of the public on controversial subjects.42 The desirability of clean air was one such subject. For example, as late as the mid-1970's TVA literature and
research promoted the idea that its enormous S02 emissions increased soil fertility and claimed that increased crop yields were
a valuable side benefit of such emissions.4 ' The adverse effects of
these emissions were rarely mentioned by TVA. Using this perverse
calculus, SO 2 emissions became equated with the public good.
TVA's conception of the public interest also neglected the interests of powerless groups in the Valley and beyond. In 1949 Rexford Tugwell and Edward Banfield, close observers of the agency,
noted TVA's failure to assist blacks and small farmers in their
quest for equal economic opportunity in the Valley.44 In the 1960's
critics charged that the agency's coal purchasing policies promoted
strip-mining with its attendant adverse social and environmental
impacts." Similarly, TVA's electric rate structure was criticized
in the 1970's for burdening low-income ratepayers. 6
At bottom, TVA rarely acknowledged that its notion of the
40. The literature on public or social choice theory assists in explaining
TVA's attempts to rest its policies on the collective preferences of its consumers.
See, e.g., A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (1980);
D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). One major flaw in TVA's approach to its constituency was its assumption that all persons preferred policies made solely according to a rational economic calculus. This approach excluded other factors that
motivate choice: for example, civic responsibility or moral beliefs. See Sagoff,
Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981); Sagoff,
We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us or Conflict and Contradictionin Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. 283 (1982). "Clean air" may be one of these transcending
concerns.
41. For an excellent description of the process in which information from
large social institutions shapes preferences, see C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND
MARKETS 201-13 (1977). See also Stewart, The Resource Allocation Role of Reviewing Courts: Common Law Functions in a Regulatory Era, in COLLECTIVE DECI
SION MAKING 226 (C. Russell ed. 1979).
42. This point goes further than TVA's excellent public relations efforts.
It includes the provision of information to key political and regulatory decisionmakers in the Valley.
43. Maugh, SO2 Pollution May be Good for Plants, 205 SCI. 383 (1979).
44. Tugwell & Banfield, Book Review, 9 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 47, 49 (1949)
(reviewing P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS (1949)).
45. See L. CALDWELL, L. HAYES & I. MACWHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 383-87 (1976); W. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 228-30 (1973).

46.
1980).

TVA Hearings on Ratemaking Standards, Summary of Record (July
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public interest was anything other than objective, benign, expert,
and value-free. It arrogated to itself the roles of executive,
legislature, and judiciary, but rarely specified, as those branches
must, the interests that were benefited or harmed by its decisions."
The agency refused to concede publicly that its decisions were influenced by powerful interests in the Valley seeking economic or
political advantage. Although its espoused goals were incontestably
democratic, TVA's methods, when they could be charted, were often
unresponsive, biased, and bureaucratized.
3.

TVA and Control of SO 2 Pollution

From the outset, TVA's self-determined mission of producing
low-cost power collided with its responsibilities for pollution
control.48 During the years when TVA was constructing its twelve
coal-fired steam plants (1940 - 1968), the responsibility for air pollution control was vested in its Division of Health and Safety.
Bureaucratically, this Division was no match for TVA's Division
of Power, the agency's driving force. Despite efforts to redirect
TVA policy toward greater appreciation of the health effects flowing from air pollution, the Division of Health and Safety did not
become a valued force within the agency until the late 1960's, when
the Division created a system designed to meet ambient air quality standards by dispersing pollutants instead of limiting them.
This system, misleadingly called SDEL (Sulfur Dioxide Emission
Limitation), combined sophisticated computer modeling with tall

47. This criticism is not exclusive to TVA. See Reich, The Law of the Planned
Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1235-36 (1966). In its arrogation of broad authority TVA
resembles the Energy Mobilization Board proposed during the Carter administration. This Board would have been vested with the power to decide major issues
surrounding the siting of major energy facilities, cutting through the procedural
requirements erected around this process. [1979] 10 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 1038-39
(Aug. 24, 1979). Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler hypothesize an agency that
closely matches TVA's own self-image: "Imagine, for example, that the NSPS
decisions were in the hands of an insulated and expert pollution control agency
concerned with the cost-effective pursuit of health-related targets established by
the Congress." B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 11, at 118 (footnote omitted). A 1970 proposal for a regional river basin authority also resembles the TVA
model. Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollution,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1527 (1970); see B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER &
D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974).
48. See M. ROBERTS & J. BLUHM, supra note 9, at 63-118. The text draws
heavily on this account, supplemented by the author's observations gained in the
course of the litigation. See also Gibbons, Gwin & Chandler, The Elficacy of Federal
EnvironnentalLegislation: The TVA Experience with EndanqeredSpecies and Clean
Air, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 701,710-16. It should be noted that under the TVA statute
the agency was empowered to pursue a range of objectives, not exclusively lowcost power. See Wirtz, supra note 27.
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stacks to disperse TVA's SO 2 emissions high into the atmosphere.4 9
Although technologically innovative, SDEL was not infallible,
particularly at TVA's Paradise, Kentucky, and Johnsonville, Tennessee, plants. S02 emissions caused hundreds of thousands of
dollars of damage to soybeans and other crops grown within range
of these plants. When crop damage occurred, TVA systematically
sought to settle all claims with the affected owners. 0
TVA's attitude toward the environmental and health effects
of its S02 emissions reflected the agency's unwillingness to tolerate
any deviation from its pursuit of cheap power. Purchasing low sulfur
coal or installing pollution controls would have added only a modest
amount to the cost of power generated by TVA (as the compliance
program adopted in this case showed). Even after the litigation,
electric power in the Valley was on the whole less expensive than
any other state east of the Mississippi. Thus, TVA decisionmakers
invariably downplayed or ignored the risks associated with air pollution while touting the quantifiable benefits of low rates.5' As the
data on health effects and long distance transport of S02 emissions mounted, TVA stubbornly adhered to a policy that, though
perhaps understandable in the 1950's when only sketchy information was available, was becoming increasingly difficult to justify
in the 1970's.
In pursuit of its low-cost power mission, TVA went through
two major cycles of decisionmaking. First was the series of decisions to construct twelve coal-fired steam plants fueled by cheap,
eastern, high sulfur coal. The second cycle, which occurred in the
late 1960's, was the agency's decision to construct seventeen nuclear
power units. At the time, this decision was based on TVA's belief
that nuclear power would be cheaper than electricity produced by
coal-fired plants. The agency also knew that its early coal-fired
units were aging and hoped to replace these units with nuclear ones.
Against the background of these major decisions, the choice
to resist constant controls was internally consistent. If the agency
could avoid committing resources to pollution control until the
nuclear units were generating electricity, the older coal-fired plants
would be retired. This was the calculated decision TVA made.
B. EPA
Congress created EPA in 1970 and charged it with implement49. The TVA system is described in Hearings on Energy and Environmental StandardsBefore the Subcomm. on Energy of the House Comm. on Science and
Technology, H.R. Doc. No. 45, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 289-446 (1973).
50. D. Stevens, Tennessee Valley Authority and Air Quality Control 15
(1976) (report prepared for the Tennessee Environmental Council).
51. E.g., TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, POWER ANNUAL REPORT 7-8 (1976).
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ing and enforcing the provisions of the Clean Air Act of 1970 and
other environmental statutes. These statutes were unusually clear
in channeling the activities and discretion of EPA. The Clean Air
Act, for example, specified tight timetables, procedures, and results
for EPA, states, and polluters.2 In part because of this specificity,
EPA at first had difficulty reconciling the rigid terms of its Congressional mandate with the abilities of industries to comply with
these new laws.
This dilemma characterized the early years of the TVA controversy. EPA's policies on tall stacks and intermittent controls
were ambiguous, reflecting the agency's dual commitment to pollution control without industrial hardship. In the face of claims by
the utility industry, led by TVA, that tall stacks would satisfy ambient air quality standards at much lower costs, EPA understandably vacillated.
One of EPA's major responsibilities under the Clean Air Act
is enforcement. 3 Like any enforcement agency, EPA had to exercise discretion, within the limits of its expertise and resources,
in choosing its targets. The agency's enforcement strategy logically
should have targeted high visibility polluters, such as TVA.
Why the agency did not proceed more vigorously against TVA
before 1977 can be explained on three grounds. First, TVA
possessed superior in-house air pollution expertise. Since the 1950's,
its research into the technology of air pollution control was well
known in technical circles. EPA, on the other hand, was an amalgam
of units formerly part of other federal agencies. It took years before
EPA coordinated and effectively used its technical expertise. This
is the primary reason why EPA relied very heavily on an outside
consultant throughout the air pollution controversy.'
A related reason for EPA's slowness in initiating enforcement
action against TVA was the delegation of the authority over the
TVA case to EPA's Region IV in Atlanta. Despite the high quality
and dedication of a small band of engineers and lawyers, Region
IV had to report through channels to EPA headquarters in
Washington, D.C. The inevitable delay in this process was no match
52. For a useful examination of the Clean Air Act's new statutory approach
to the problem of agency discretion, see Ingram, The PoliticalRationality of In-

novation: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, in

APPROACHES TO CONTROL-

LING AIR POLLUTION 12 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978).

53. See J. Hudson, An Institutional Assessment of the Implementation and
Enforcement of the Clean Air Act 47-63 (1980) (prepared for National Commission on Air Quality); Note, Enforcement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
10 URB. L. ANN. 297 (1976).
54. For example, PEDCO developed the systemwide compliance plan that
served as the basis for the initial phases of the litigation. PEDCO Environmental, Inc., An SO 2 Compliance Strategy For the Fossil Fuel Fired Stations of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (Feb. 1977).
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for TVA's more streamlined processes of internal decisionmaking.
Second, EPA faced problems general to all attempts by government to regulate itself. 5 The more persuasive TVA was that its
mission, in fact, furthered the collective good in the Valley, the
more difficult it became for EPA to assert that its national
regulatory goals transcended TVA's. EPA represented a real threat
to TVA's long-standing institutional autonomy. TVA reacted to this
threat by mobilizing its political allies in the Valley and in
Washington to discourage such encroachment.
When it appeared that EPA also could muster political support for its actions against TVA, the two agencies attempted to
resolve the problem through informal negotiations. The 1975 EPATVA Joint Task Force Report represents this abortive effort."
The clash of conceptions about their respective missions in this
report is apparent: EPA focused on air pollution and its effects;
TVA on the problems and cost of pollution control technology.
These differences prevented the two agencies from entering into
informal mechanisms for resolving problems. Such mechanisms are
typical of large institutions that face the prospect of conducting
business with each other for a long period of time.17 It is testimony
to the bitterness of this dispute that such bilateral controls never
materialized, despite the efforts of the heads of both agencies to
resolve the conflict.
Finally, a potentially serious legal impediment to enforcement
action by EPA existed. The issue was whether EPA could sue TVA
under section 113 of the Clean Air Act. The issue hinged on the
extent of control exercised by the President over TVA. If TVA
was subject to a directive by the President to comply with the
SO 2 requirements of the Clean Air Act, then, arguably, no
justiciable controversy between TVA and EPA existed. If, however,
TVA was sufficiently independent of executive control, a justiciable
controversy would be present. This issue provoked controversy
between EPA and the United States Department of Justice, EPA's
representative in court. On August 22, 1977, after EPA's intervention in the citizens' suits, the Justice Department concluded that
TVA was "subject to the direction and control of the President.
It is our conclusion that Executive Order 11752 [instructing all
federal agencies to comply with the provisions of the Clean Air
55. For an overview of these problems, see Wilson & Rachal, Can Government Regulate Itself?, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1977, at 3.
56. EPA & TVA, Preliminary Assessment of Alternative Sulfur Oxide Control Strategies for TVA Steam Plants (rev. ed. Jan. 1975).
57. These "repeat player" institutions often develop "informal bilateral controls" to govern their conduct without resort to litigation. See Galanter, Why
the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW
AND SoCY REV. 95, 110-13 (1974).
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Act] applies to the TVA and that the President has the authority
to insist upon compliance with that directive."5 8 This conclusion
presumably reflected Justice's opinion that EPA could not sue TVA
directly.
Since -the development of the first State Implementation Plans
(SIPs) in 1971,' 9 EPA regional officials sought to develop close working relationships with the Valley states and the few active citizens'
organizations involved in environmental issues. As the controversy
evolved, these relationships became crucial. By 1975, the date TVA
was to have complied with the emission limitations contained in
the respective state SIPs, TVA had taken no meaningful steps
toward compliance. The main hope for breaking the EPA-TVA impasse lay with the States and citizens' organizations.
C. The Citizens' Organizations
The citizens' organizations that brought the litigation
represented an unusual coalition. Traditional environmental
organizations (the Sierra Club, Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness
Planning, the Tennessee Environmental Council (TEC), and the
Vanderbilt Environment Group), public health organizations (the
Alabama Lung Association and the Tennessee Thoracic Society),"
a "good government" group (the Tennessee League of Women
58. Letter from Larry Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice to Douglas Costle,
Administrator, EPA at 3 (Aug. 22, 1977). The opinion was rendered in response
to a request by Costle. Letter from Douglas Costle to Griffin Bell, Attorney
General (July 22, 1977). The opinion relied heavily on Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d
990 (6th Cir. 1940), in which the President's power to remove Arthur Morgan,
TVA's first chairman, was sustained. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
694-97 (1974) (Special Prosecutor sufficiently insulated from Presidential control
to create justiciable controversy).
In Algernon Blair Indus. Contractors v. TVA, 540 F. Supp. 551 (M.D. Ala.
1982), a Freedom of Information Act suit by a TVA contractor, the Court rejected an unexpected attempt by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to strike the
appearance of TVA attorneys in the case and substitute DOJ attorneys. The Court
found that TVA possessed independent litigating authority which could be derived from its statute and past practice and by considering prior cases in which
TVA and DOJ were on opposing sides. In citing these cases the opinion concluded: "The able attorney for DOJ is unable to suggest a satisfactory explanation
of how the Attorney General can represent one party to litigation while he has
the authority to control the litigation of the opposing party." Id. at 556.
59. Under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S 7410(a)(1) (Supp. IV (1980) (formerly
codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1857c-5(a)), SIPs are "plan(s) which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standards in each air quality
control region (or portion thereof within such State)." See W. RODGERS, supra
note 14, S 3.5, at 230.
60. The board of the Tennessee Lung Association rejected their staff's
recommendation to participate in the litigation at the urging of Dr. Peter Krenkle,
a board member, who was also Director of TVA's Division of Environmental Plan-
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Voters), grassroots consumer-energy groups (East Tennessee
Energy Group and Save Our Cumberland Mountains), and a national environmental organization (Natural Resources Defense Council [NRDC]) joined their common concerns to precipitate judicial
involvement in the EPA-TVA stalemate." Of these organizations,
the League of Women Voters and the Tennessee Environmental
Council participated in this controversy from its start. Representatives from these latter groups testified at the first hearings on
Tennessee's SIP and continued to comment on TVA's compliance
strategies even after the litigation began.2
NRDC's role was crucial. Even before the TVA coalition was
formed, NRDC disseminated valuable technical and scientific information on tall stacks, flue gas desulfurization systems (scrubbers), coal quality and availability, and other issues central to compliance by utilities with the Clean Air Act. This information was
used by the League and TEC in their testimony and comments
regarding TVA's plans. The organized presentation of sound alternatives to TVA's air pollution plans was unprecedented. TVA's
monopoly on the underlying expertise necessary to formulate air
pollution policies was challenged for the first time by Valley groups
drawing on the national resources of NRDC and its counterparts
in the Washington public interest community.
NRDC had also been active in the courts and Congress in opposing the use of tall stacks by polluters." In many of these efforts, NRDC regularly confronted TVA officials. The TVA litigation provided NRDC with an opportunity to participate in an enning. Dr. Krenkle's obvious conflict of interest did not deter him from participating
in the Board's deliberations.
61. This was an unusually broad-based coalition of social reform groups.
See generally J. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 254-61 (1977); J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 5-14 (1979); McCarthy & Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. OF SOC'Y 1212 (1977). Their ability to overcome the high costs (not just monetary) of organizing the air pollution effort rested
on the informed and energetic leadership of a handful of the organizations in
the coalition. For the seminal discussion of this problem, see M. OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). See also Mitchell, National Environmental Lobbies
and the Apparent Illogic of CollectiveAction, in C. Russell, supra note 41, at 87-121;
S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 131-48 (1974).

62. See, e.g., Statement of Dr. Ruth Neff, Executive Director, Tennessee
Environmental Council before Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board (July 13,
1977) (urging Board to deny variance petitions submitted by TVA and inviting
Board to join litigation).
63. See, e.g., Hearings on the Implementation of the Clean Air Amendments
of 1977, pt. 1 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Comm.
on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (testimony of Richard Ayres).
64. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d
390 (5th Cir. 1974).
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forcement action against the utility industry's leading opponent
of constant controls.
Why did this coalition form? The impact of TVA's environmental
policies on the health and welfare of the eastern United States
was only dimly perceived before the 1970's. With the creation of
EPA and the national environmental organizations and the
emergence of new data about the effects of air pollution and the
costs of control, TVA became an object of obvious attention. Its
leadership in utility industry resistance to constant controls, 6 5 its
open violation of the requirements contained in the SIPs, and its
inability to present to the public balanced viewpoints on the questions raised by its pollution policies encouraged the interested
organizations to take collective action.
The broad base of the coalition permitted it to blunt TVA's
claims that it was acting in the best interests of its consumers.
These organizations were composed of TVA's own consumers and
could credibly accuse TVA of championing an ersatz consumerism
and environmentalism. The coalition could look beyond the narrow confines of TVA's bureaucratic constraints and legitimately
claim that the nation's good-not just the Valley's-demanded different policies. But TVA persisted. Even after the notice letter
explaining the coalition's intention to sue, TVA invoked the public
interest in a last attempt to discourage litigation:
In View of the fact that our compliance program is well underway and during the interim public health and welfare will be protected, we believe the overall public interest would best be served
by having the States, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
TVA continue to work out the remaining scheduling problems
without judicial intervention of the type you seek. We can see
no public benefit that would flow from such lawsuits."
As with many disagreements over public policies and the public
interest, the issue was taken to the courts.
65. TVA was an active member in the utility trade associations, including
the Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG). An example of TVA's influence is re-

counted in E.

BARDACH

& R.

KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF

(1982):
A copper smelter in a southern state was cited for excess SO 2 emissions, not removed effectively by its existing filtration system. The state
pollution control agency called upon the company to install a certain type
of scrubber system. The company's environmental engineer complained,
"We argued that a scrubber was impractical." I called TVA [which had
extensive pollution control systems]. They were antiscrubber because
of enormous maintenance and break down problems. But the agency people said it could be done. They felt they knew better than us [sic].
Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
66. Letter from Lynn Seeber, General Manager, TVA to Dean Hill Rivkin
at 4 (April 8, 1977).
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS
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D. The States: Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee
TVA's relations with the States have been notably one-sided
when complex policy issues were at stake. TVA's superior expertise overwhelmed the understaffed agencies responsible for overseeing TVA activities in Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 7 Because
of its close association with large industries and electric power
distributors, TVA also exercised considerable political influence
in the respective state governments, particularly Tennessee.
With the advent of a stronger state role in air pollution control under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, TVA and the
states clashed over important questions of state versus TVA
autonomy. The highpoint in this dispute occurred in Hancock v.
Train," where the United States Supreme Court rejected Kentucky's attempt to require TVA to submit to state air pollution
permit requirements on the ground that section 118 of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970 governing federal facilities did not
waive TVA's sovereign immunity. This decision, which was explicitly overruled by Congress in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act,69 was a phyrric victory for TVA. The agency had agreed
that it would comply with all substantive state air pollution requirements; it would not, however, obtain a permit, the key to the
state's enforcement efforts.
Against the background, it is not surprising that Kentucky and
Alabama joined the litigation initiated by the citizens' organizations in June 1977. Each state had an active environmental section in its Attorney General's office and had experience regulating
utilities other than TVA. In their view TVA deserved the same
treatment as other noncomplying air pollution sources.
Tennessee did not join the suits. Among the three states, TVA's
influence was by far the strongest in Tennessee. 0 TVA was Ten67. In developing the first SIPs in 1971-72, it was not uncommon for states
to rely heavily on the resources of major polluters. "[Plolitics, leadership, organization and management [also] all played significant roles in determining what actually occurred at the state level." Roberts & Farrell, The PoliticalEconomy of
Implementation: The Clean Air Act and Stationary Sources, in APPROACHES TO
CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION, supra note 42, at 153; see Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalismin Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
68. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
69. Section 118 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. S
7418 (Supp. IV 1980), explicitly waived the sovereign immunity of polluting federal
facilities, thus subjecting them to the full reach of a state's enforcement authority. During Congressional hearing on compliance by federal facilities with pollution law, TVA was singled out for its massive resistance. H. R. REP. No. 294,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1977).
70. Among the three states, only the Tennessee Legislature expressed ac-
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nessee's major electric utility, and the State Air Pollution Control
Division was openly dependent on TVA data and resources to fulfill
its responsibilities under the Clean Air Act.
One of the ironies of the litigation was the ability of the citizens'
organizations to represent what they perceived as the interests
of Tennessee. Without representation in the negotiations, Tennessee essentially forfeited its opportunity to shape TVA's control plans for the eight Tennessee plants. Although all parties to
the litigation kept the Tennessee Air Pollution Control Division
staff apprised of significant decisions made during the negotiations,
Tennessee's input was inconsequential.
Early in the cases, TVA attempted to force Tennessee to align
itself with the agency in the litigation by threatening to join the
state into the case as an indispensable party." At the same time,
attorneys for the Tennessee citizens' organizations were attempting
to convince the State Attorney General's Office that the state
should join them as plaintiffs in the case. This countervailing
pressure played a part in neutralizing the state.
TVA desired a systemwide resolution to its problems. Without
Tennessee in the case, there was always the chance that TVA could
be subject to requirements promulgated subsequent to the resolution of the litigation that might conflict with the terms of the decree.
One of the major benefits TVA gained from the settlement was
its ability to negotiate with its two toughest regulatory jurisdictions in a single proceeding. In essence, the decree created a
regional air pollution control plan that crossed state boundaries.72
Through this plan, TVA achieved a measure of certainty that it
might otherwise have lost in separate state actions. Throughout
the negotiations there was always the risk that one state might
perceive that another was benefiting more-either in emission
reductions or schedule of compliance. Recognizing that trade-offs
were inevitable, EPA and the citizens' organizations, in cooperation with Alabama and Kentucky, strove to develop a comprehensive plan that would benefit the whole region's environment.
E.

73
The TVA Distributors

TVA power is distributed through a network of rural and
municipal cooperatives and distributors. In 1947 these distributor
tive interest in the controversy. The Tennessee Legislature, for example, enacted
a resolution supporting TVA in the dispute. Tenn. H. Res. 44, 90th Gen. Ass.,
1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1575.
71. Telephone conversation with James Bycott, Attorney, Tennessee Air
Pollution Control Division (Oct. 18, 1977).
72. See E. ROBERTS, supra note 28.
73. Much of this section is drawn from R. Couto, New Seeds at the Grass
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organizations formed the Tennessee Valley Public Power Association (TVPPA), an umbrella enterprise whose initial purpose was
to lobby Congress on legislative matters affecting TVA. In the
1950's TVPPA and its members united to defend TVA policies
against criticisms leveled against the agency by private power interests and unfriendly politicians in Washington.
TVPPA and its members formed close relationships with Valley
politicians, both federal and state, and industries. All shared similar
interests in rural economic development; electrification through
TVA was the key to such growth. For its part, TVA used the
distributor organizations to further its policy ends. The 1954 TVA
Self-Financing Amendment, in which TVA gained financial
autonomy from Congress, was largely a product of TVA and
distributor efforts. 4
In the 1960's the distributors, through the TVPPA, actively
promoted the growth of electric power use in the Valley. They
also frequently lobbied Congress to encourage the expansion of
the TVA power system. During those years, the distributors objected occasionally to TVA practices, but this criticism was overshadowed by their common purposes.
When TVA electric rates began to rise in 1967, the distributors
vigorously encouraged TVA to adhere to its low-cost power
heritage. This was at the time TVA's SDEL policy was being
forged. When electric rates continued to rise, the distributors, who
took the brunt of consumer complaints about rate increases, increased their pressure on TVA and Congress to maintain low rates.
In the early years of the air pollution conflict, the distributors
strongly supported TVA's position. When the litigation began, it
was logical for those close allies of the agency to assume that TVA
would persist in its stand against costly air pollution controls. As
the negotiations evolved, however, the distributors' faith in TVA
lapsed, and a group of Tennessee distributors and cooperatives
intervened in the case in April 1979.
It is important to emphasize that TVPPA and the distributors
were not as monolithic as they might have appeared. Municipal
distributors, for example, often have differing interests from the
rural cooperatives. In the air pollution conflict the Tennessee Electric Cooperative Association and the Tennessee Municipal Power
Association intervened in the case only on behalf of a segment
of the membership of each organization. Large municipal
Roots: The Politics of the TVA Power Program Since World War II (Dec. 3, 1981)
(paper prepared for a conference on the Tennessee Valley Authority: An Experiment in American Government). For other works on the TVA distributor system,

see V.

HOBDAY,

74.
(1961).

supra note 33; A.

WILDAVSKY,

supra note 32.

See Jones, The Financing of TVA, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 725
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distributors, such as the ones in Memphis, Nashville, and Knoxville, did not join the intervention. The failure of these urban
systems to join the controversy raises questions of representativeness similar to those surrounding the involvement of the private
citizens' organizations in the case. The organizations that did intervene, moreover, have been accused of representing only elite
business interests in each community. The numbers of minorities
or women who serve on the boards of these organizations are quite
small." Whether the distributors actually spoke for the interests
of residential (as opposed to industrial) consumers is debatable. 6
IV.

THE LITIGATION AND COMPLEX ENFORCEMENT

A.

Public Law Advocacy

Public law advocacy at its best has two broad ambitions." One
is to ensure that interests not previously represented in the
pluralist bargaining process of government policymaking are effectively heard."8 Because these interests are usually diffuse, public
interest advocacy organizations serve as vehicles for collecting
group preferences and presenting varied alternatives to government decisionmakers. Although these organizations have always
operated in the administrative and legislative arenas to advocate
their positions, their most visible gains have occurred in the courts.79
Through strategic litigation, public interest organizations have succeeded in significantly increasing the number of interests able to
participate in government decisions.
75. See Comments of Neil G. McBride, Director, Rural Legal Services of
Tennessee in TVA Public Hearings on Ratemaking Standards (May 10, 1982).
76. The policies of the distributor organizations are made by their respective boards of directors, who are either locally elected or appointed. Because of
their regular contact with customers through monthly electric bills, it would not
be difficult for distributors to conduct referenda on issues of major concern. For
an innovative proposal to expand public participation in utility decisionmaking,
see Leflar & Rogol, Consumer Participationin the Regulation of Public Utilities:
A Model Act, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235 (1976); cf. Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (state cannot have promotional advertising
by utility). The distributors would have to ensure that the presentation of information on each issue is balanced, an extremely difficult task in light of the
resources local industries might bring to bear on such referenda.
77. For a sophisticated theoretical discussion of public advocacy, see
Trubek, Public Advocacy: Administrative Government and the Representation of
Diffuse Interests, in 3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1979). See also Denvir, Toward a Political
Theory of Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1133 (1976).
78. For a good statement of this justification, see Lazarus & Onek, The
Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1971).
79. An early survey of the successes of public interest law is contained
in COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA

(1976).
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A second aim of public advocacy is more focused and instrumental: To reform institutional practices that deviate from positive
law or widely shared public norms. One commentator has termed
this phenomenon "complex enforcement." "Complex enforcement
is a type of adjudication in which the wrong is a practice, the
remedy is a plan, and the party structure aims at collective
resolution."8
Complex enforcement suits are aimed at important social institutions: for example, schools, prisons, housing agencies, and
polluters. Government agencies and citizens have both been empowered to sue deviant institutions. The private enforcement action, a merger of traditional notions of public and private law, "provides a course of action to protect the public interest which is maintainable by private parties without a showing of particular injury
to them, either threatened or realized. This combination of public
regulation and private enforcement is a novelty in the American
legal system. '"81
B.

Crystallizing the TVA Dispute Through Citizen Enforcement82

In March, 1977, TVA announced that it would comply with applicable emission limitations on a constant basis.8" This announce80. L. Sargentich, Complex Enforcement 8 (Mar. 1978) (unpublished
manuscript).
81. Mashaw, Private Enforcement of Public Regulatory Provisions: The
Citizen Suit, 4 CLASS ACTION RPTS. 29, 31 (1975). The law of standing in public interest litigation is always in flux. The abolition of the standing requirement has
sensibly been urged. See, e.g., Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest
in the United StateA, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343, 407-08 (1974); Tushnet, The New Law
of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977). See generally
Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193
(1982) (justifying selective role of courts in correcting deficient administrative
performance).
82. This article benefited from a paper on the TVA air pollution litigation
by political scientists who interviewed many of the major actors, R. Durant, M.
Fitzgerald & L. Thomas, When Government Regulates Itself: The EPA/TVA Air
Pollution Control Experience (April 1980) (University of Tennessee, Bureau of
Public Administration Working Paper No. 1), and from a case study conducted
by the National Commission on Air Quality. R. McMahon, S. Farrell, & E. Kane,
An Institutional Assessment of the Implementation and Enforcement of the Clean
Air Act: Eastern Tennessee Valley Case Study (1980).
83. The announcement was made at an enforcement conference finally convened by EPA. TVA's news release concluded with a statement of its position
that echoed its past posture:
We recognize our obligation to proceed expeditiously to meet the
stringent standards ....

However, we also intend to exercise our right

to work with the states and others for recognition of more reasonable
approaches to sulfur dioxide control. Let me emphasize that this search
we have been through for the least expensive methods of meeting the
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ment appeared to end the years of resistance by TVA over the
issue of constant controls. But the states and the citizens' organizations and EPA distrusted TVA's intention to comply with all applicable emission limitations through constant controls. By this time,
the agency had lost substantial credibility by its persistent
strategies designed to delay compliance. Those involved also knew
that Congress was considering mid-course amendments to the Clean
Air Act. The compliance strategy announced by TVA at the March
1977 meeting relied heavily on the use of low sulfur western coal.
The displacement of TVA's traditional eastern coal markets for
western coal would surely cause economic dislocations and political
backlash. The overstated costs of the compliance program,
moreover, would undoubtedly stimulate political controversy in the
deliberations over the Clean Air Act.' Because of this distrust of
TVA's intentions and the opinion that the March 1977 compliance
plan was environmentally unsound, would not achieve compliance
as rapidly as possible, and was virtually unenforceable, the citizens'
organizations decided to crystallize the dispute by filing citizens
suits under section 304 of the Clean Air Act."
Filing the suits was a major step for the citizens' coalition. To
ensure that TVA would not overwhelm their meager resources,
the citizens' organizations gained tentative commitments from
Alabama and Kentucky to intervene in the citizens' suits. In addition, the staff at EPA Region IV promised to use their best efforts to gain agency approval to join in the suits. This came at
a time in the spring of 1977 when a new administration was being
formed in Washington, D.C. Although the situation was fluid, the
prospects of EPA involvement appeared sufficiently promising to
clinch the citizens' decision to proceed.
The suits were filed in June 1977. Because section 304 of the
Clean Air Act required that an enforcement case be filed in the

requirements of the Clean Air Act has not been for TVA. Everything
we have done has been for the benefit of the consumers of TVA power,
and nothing we have proposed would adversely affect the environment
in any way.
TVA News Release, TVA to Burn Low-Sulfur Coal to Meet Emission Standards
2-3 (March 21, 1977) (statement of L. Wallace, TVA Deputy General Counsel).
84. In its announcement, TVA stated: "If we could press a button today
and have the [air compliance] program in operation, it would mean a rate increase
of $282 million a year to users of TVA power," a spokesman said. "Actually, it
will take until the early 1980's to complete construction of the large facilities
this program requires, and by that time the effects of inflation probably will increase that cost by almost another $100 million a year. To put these costs into
some perspective, total production costs for the TVA power system were $242
million in 1970, before the impact of fuel and other cost increases that have already
had a major effect on electric bills." Id. at 1.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. IV 1980).
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federal judicial district where the offending plant is located, suits
were filed in five judicial districts in Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Ultimately, TVA and the plaintiffs both agreed to consolidate all Sixth Circuit suits in Nashville and to proceed separately
with the Fifth Circuit Alabama litigation.
The complaints were standard enforcement fare. The plaintiffs
paid special attention to the possibility that TVA might challenge
their standing to sue. In anticipation of this potential obstacle, they
developed standardized standing allegations. For example:
The TENNESSEE THORACIC SOCIETY'S members are
adversely affected by emissions from the defendants' Johnsonville,
Cumberland, and Gallatin Steam Plants. Those adverse effects
include: (1) adverse effects on human life and health caused by
degraded air quality; (2) adverse effects on productivity and viability of agricultural and forest lands; of streams and lakes; and of
the remainder of the natural environment; and (3) adverse effects
on the esthetic enjoyment of an unpolluted atmospheric environment. The TENNESSEE THORACIC SOCIETY'S members are
in the class of persons whom the Federal Clean Air Act was intended to benefit and protect. Compliance with the emission limitations specified in, the Federal Clean Air Act and the laws and
the state implementation plan of Tennessee is the means mandated by the Act for the protection of the interests detailed above,
and the interests the TENNESSEE THORACIC SOCIETY'S
members are therefore adversely affected and aggrieved by the
defendants' failure to comply with emission limitations."
This allegation was intended to meet the argument that TVA's
SO 2 emissions did not cause harm to the environment.
The plaintiffs' other major concern in drafting their complaints
involved the possible relief available. Concerned with public reaction, they believed it would be imprudent even to suggest that
shutdown of an offending plant was a viable remedy. They also
did not feel competent to recommend a detailed compliance plan
to the courts. Instead, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief forbidding emissions in excdss of the applicable limit at each plant, and compliance with the injunction "as
expeditiously as possible."
The citizens' organizations delegated to their lawyers-the
author in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Richard Ayres of NRDC in
Washington, D.C.-substantial discretion in pursuing the litigation.
Each organization was kept informed about the progress of the
case through regular memoranda, and it was informally agreed
that the Executive Director of the Tennessee Environmental Council, Dr. Ruth Neff in Nashville, Tennessee, would serve as a liaison
86.

Complaint,

4, Tennessee Thoracic Society v. Freeman, supra note 2.

19821

PUBLIC LAW ADVOCACY

for all the organizations. Dr. Neff had been involved with the issue
since the early 1970's and was familiar with its technical and scientific aspects. Each group was expected to contact Dr. Neff or either
lawyer with any comments or concerns over strategy or direction.
Periodic meetings between the lawyers and representatives of the
groups also occurred.
As it evolved, the case was distinctly dominated by the
judgments of the lawyers. The task of constructing a totally
democratic decisionmaking process within the coalition -complete
with full and intelligible information and a sophisticated structure
for ensuring that all views were considered and conflicts resolved 87
proved too burdensome within limits of the available resources.
However, because of common perceptions shared by the organizations about TVA and the effects of air pollution and the extraordinary complexity of the issues, no serious intra-organization conflict arose during the entire course of the litigation.
C. From Court to Congress
Almost simultaneous with the filing of the suits in June 1977,
Congress began intensive debate on amending the Clean Air Act.
As predicted, TVA lobbied Congress heavily to amend the Act
to exempt its large, older plants -Johnsonville (Tennessee),
Kingston (Tennessee), Paradise (Kentucky), and Widows Creek
(Alabama)-from the requirement of constant emission controls.
Through Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, TVA argued that
complying with constant emission controls at these old plants was
too costly and unnecessary to meet ambient air quality standards.
The lawyers for the citizens' organizations joined the lobbying
effort in Washington, D.C. They met with staff members of the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works to encourage
rejection of the Baker Amendment. They countered TVA's contentions by claiming that: (1) compliance with the existing standards
would not significantly increase consumer rates (their estimate was
$2.42 per month); (2) the litigation would try to ensure that TVA's
compliance plan would not severely disrupt eastern coal markets;
(3)"rewarding TVA for its resistance would be inequitable to other
utilities that had made good faith efforts to comply with constant
controls; and (4). TVA, as the government's utility, was an ideal
testing ground for installation of innovative pollution control
technology.
87. Public interest lawyers have been criticized for their lack of accountability to clients. See Note, In Defense of an Embattled Mode of Advocacy: An
Analysis and Justification of Public Interest Practice, 90 YALE L.J. 1436, 1453-57
(1981). This issue deserves greater jurisprudential treatment. See generally T.
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); Stewart, supranote 35, at 1762-70.
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In June 1977 the proposed Baker Amendment was defeated.88
When enacted in August 1977, section 123 of the 1977 Amendments
instead read in pertinent part:
In establishing an emission limitation for coal-fired steam electric
generating units which are subject to the provisions of section
7418 [the federal facilities sections] and which commenced operation before July 1, 1957, the effect of the entire stack height of
stacks for which a construction contract was awarded before
February 8, 1974, may be taken into account.89
This provision was a classic "private bill." Only one plant in the
country, TVA's Kingston Steam Plant, met its standards. Senator
Baker had managed to salvage this concession for his constituents
in the upper east Tennessee coal fields, Kingston's primary suppliers of coal.
The 1977 Amendments sent other signals to TVA that Congress was unhappy with its performance on pollution control. Section 118," 0 for example, overruled Hancock v. Train" and thereby
subjected federal facilities to the full reach of state enforcement
authority. Section 125 created a national preference for the use
of high sulfur eastern coal, encouraging the construction of
scrubbers.2 Section 123 condemned the use of intermittent controls, and its legislative history noted serious concerns over atmospheric loading and long distance transport of SO 2 emissions."
D. The Changing of the Guard at TVA and EPA
During the first months of the litigation, both sides expressed
reluctance to litigate this enforcement case fully. TVA conceded
that it was violating the state SIPs, but contended that its existing compliance plan, modified by an agreement to import less
western coal and to construct scrubbers at certain plants, was
satisfactory. The plaintiffs unanimously believed that the plan did
not represent the most expeditious or environmentally sound plan
88. Senator Baker argued that because of EPA "confusion" on the question of dispersion enhancement techniques, TVA was justified in constructing
tall stacks at Kingston. Senator Edmund Muskie, noting that the Committee was
not "unaware of the inequities of the particular situation which concerned the
Senator, acceded to the amendment but justified the rejection of the original
Baker Amendment: "[W]e simply did not want to trigger a policy of widespread
approval of tall stacks as a method of continuously controlling pollutants." 123
Cong. Rec. S9443 (daily ed. June 10, 1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 7423(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
90. 42 U.S.C. S 7418 (Supp. IV 1980).
91. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
92. 42 U.S.C. S 7425 (Supp. IV 1980).
93. House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, H. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-94 (1977).

PUBLIC LAW ADVOCACY

19821

871

that could be formulated. Moreover, they suspected that the TVA
leadership was not fully committed to implementing the plan and
would pursue any viable escape hatch to avoid full compliance.
In July 1977 President Carter made two appointments that
would profoundly affect the litigation. He appointed S. David
Freeman to be the third TVA Board member and Marvin Durning, a Seattle lawyer, to be Assistant Administrator for Enforcement at EPA. Both men took an immediate interest in the case.
Freeman saw the case as providing an opportunity to realize his
ideas about energy production and pollution control. He also
perceived that a favorable resolution to the controversy would improve TVA's tarnished national reputation. Both President Carter
and Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, a member of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, charged Freeman
to use his best efforts to untie the knot that had developed."'
Durning, too, saw the case as presenting him with an opportunity to begin his enforcement responsibilities with a high visibility
case. 95 Coming from private law practice where he specialized in
environmental litigation, he realized that TVA's position was
untenable and that a major victory of some kind was certain. Upon
assuming office, he immediately took steps for EPA to intervene
in the cases.
By late summer 1977, all parties agreed to enter into settlement discussions. No serious steps were taken to expedite the litigation (even though preliminary injunctive relief had been requested),
and neither court took the initiative. Instead, the parties began
bargaining over an acceptable systemwide compliance plan.
V.

THE NEGOTIATIONS AND COMPLEX BARGAINING

Before serious bargaining could begin, trust among the actors
had to be established.9" This was primarily accomplished by David
Freeman's decision to lead TVA in the negotiations. His open questioning of TVA's past positions on the issues and his seeming willingness to entertain alternatives suggested by the plaintiffs
demonstrated a flexibility never before exhibited by TVA. Marvin Durning also committed his attention to the negotiations.
Richard Ayres, whose expertise in air pollution policymaking was
respected by the TVA staff, contributed to the climate of trust
that developed.
94. See Hearinqs on the Nomination of S. David Freeman Befbre Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Worki,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977).
95. See Hearings on the Nomination of Marvin B. Durning Before Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977).
96. For the importance of trust in negotiation, see R. FISHER & W. URY,
GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 17-57 (1981).
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Ayres' prominent role in the negotiations exemplified the public
use of private power. His policy positions often prevailed both in
the bargaining that was conducted both among the plaintiffs and
with TVA. Because of his extensive experience in air pollution
lawmaking and policymaking, his judgments about the impact that
certain issues in the TVA case would have nationally was accorded
great deference.
The technical staffs of TVA and EPA and EPA's consultant,
PEDco Associates, also wielded substantial influence in the negotiations. Their estimates of the availability of complying coal, the
reliability of alternative scrubber processes, and the achievability
of certain deadlines carried great, but not dispositive, weight in
the talks. In one area-atmospheric modeling-the views of the
experts were often in conflict. When this occurred, the parties attempted to specify an emission limitation that would enhance the
likelihood of reaching a final statement.
The negotiations, which lasted from August 1977 to March 1978,
were a blend of conflict and collaboration.9 7 The parties were determined to reach a compromise, and little discussion, if any, was
devoted to the consequences of full-scale litigation because the parties were reluctant to present these dense issues to a court.
The chief issues in the negotiation have been canvassed by
Keith Casto.9" A few deserve special mention. First,the plaintiffs
responded favorably to TVA's idea to install innovative scrubber
processes at appropriate plants. They believed that TVA's adoption of these technologies and its commitment of resources to assure
the success of these processes would encourage the utility industry's acceptance of this technology. Second, the plaintiffs insisted that TVA abandon its plans to purchase large quantities
of low sulfur western coal. They feared that TVA's large-scale purchases of western coal would be an opening wedge to the development of these reserves. The consequences of such development
would devastate TVA's customary eastern coal markets. Third,
the plaintiffs insisted that TVA enter into "turn-key" contracts
with outside contractors to expedite compliance. Long accustomed
to using its own design and construction forces on major projects,
TVA was at first reluctant to agree to these provisions. But such
concerns had to be subordinated to the goal of achieving compliance
97. In many respects, the negotiations were a paradigm of environmental
dispute resolution. See M. WESSEL, SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE 85-113 (1980);
Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution,
9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311 (1980). Negotiation has also been advocated as an
alternative to the cumbersome agency rulemaking process. Note, Rethinking
Regulation: Negotiation As An Alternative to TraditionalRulemaking, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1871 (1981).
98. Casto, supra note 4.
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as rapidly as feasible, since even the most rapid schedule would
achieve compliance five years or more after Congress had originally
ordered. Fourth, the plaintiffs insisted that TVA take all feasible
steps to reduce emissions in the interim before final compliance.
Complaining that such measures would disrupt their power system
and add extra cost, TVA bargained hard to reduce those requirements and succeeded in limiting the plaintiffs' demands at
certain plants. Fifth, the plaintiffs insisted that any settlement be
fully enforceable. Because a period of three years or more would
be needed to carry out the compliance program, a package of requirements ranging from regular reporting to the creation of an
implementation committee was built into the decree. Finally, none
of the parties seriously believed that TVA would be required to
pay a civil penalty anywhere close to the $260,000,000 calculated
by EPA. The exchange of this penalty for environmental improvements at Cumberland was one of the final stumbling blocks
before a settlement was reached. The exchange was accomplished
to satisfy Freeman's goal of converting TVA into a "model" utility (one that anticipates future regulatory demands) and Durning's
insistence that a penalty was necessary in this case to convey to
other 99polluting sources EPA's resolve to seek penalties in future
cases.
When the parties reached a tentative agreement in March 1978,
the plaintiffs were cautiously optimistic that the long controversy
would soon end. Although they had no assurances from David
Freeman that he could convince his fellow Board members to join
him in signing the agreement, the apparent commitment of the
TVA staff to the agreement was basis for hope. This hope was
dashed in the following two months.
In May 1978 William Jenkins resigned from the TVA Board,
citing EPA's encroachment on TVA's traditional autonomy in
managing the agency.' 0 Also, Aubrey Wagner completed his term
as Chairman of TVA. Weeks prior to his retirement, he indicated
to David Freeman, who communicated the news to the plaintiffs,
that he would reluctantly sign the decree in order to end the years
of controversy. In the final hours of his term, however, he announced that, because he believed the settlement was inimical to
the interests of TVA consumers, he would refuse to sign. 01
In the following months TVA launched the compliance program
called for in the consent decree. This was a step they were compelled to take if the decree was to remain intact. The plaintiffs,
fearing that a new appointee to the TVA Board might unravel the
99.
100.
101.

Now Freeman Can Reshape the TVA, Bus. WK. 34-35 (April 17, 1978).
N.Y. Times, May 6, 1978, S 1, at 10, col. 1.
Knoxville News Sentinel, May 18, 1978, S 1, at 1, col. 6.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

whole agreement, insisted on compliance with the major terms of
the settlement. When Richard Freeman was ultimately appointed
to the TVA Board in December 1978, he signed the decree as one
of his first major acts in office.' 2
VI.

INTERVENTION

In January 1979 the consent decree was submitted to the
District Courts in Nashville and Birmingham for approval. Weeks
before the decree was submitted, the press had publicized that
Barry Bosworth of the President's Council on Wage and Price
Stability (COWPS) had criticized the settlement in a letter to an
executive of a large industry located in the Valley.' Bosworth's
undocumented criticism was that the settlement was unnecessarily
expensive and hence inflationary. Senator James Sasser of Tennessee picked up this theme in public comments.
When the decree was submitted to the respective courts, each
had only scant previous involvement with the cases. Aware of the
public criticism of the decree by Bosworth and Sasser, the District
Judge in Nashville ordered the parties to submit "information
regarding the economic impact of such a consent decree on the
residents and consumers of electricity in the Tennessee Valley."'0 4
The court requested data regarding "the estimated increased cost
per month per residential user expected to result from implementation of the consent decree, as well as the estimated impact on
inflation, including increased cost to commercial and industrial users
and any such cost expected to be passed on the consumers."'' This
request for economic data was unprecedented and overlooked the
balancing of economic and environmental factors Congress had performed in formulating the Clean Air Act.
The Statement of Economic Impacts was submitted to the court
in March 1980. It was an unusual document: it required all parties
to the decree to agree on issues that long divided them. For example, EPA and the citizens' organizations insisted that the Statement include specific figures regarding the benefits flowing from

102. His confirmation hearings, in which the air pollution settlement was
discussed, foreshadowed his speedy approval of the decree. Hearings on the
Nomination of Richard M. Freeman Before Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1978).
103. Letter from Barry Bosworth to E. G. Chaves, Consolidated Aluminum
Co. (Jan. 10, 1979), reprinted in Hearings on Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1979).
104. Order, Tennessee Thoracic Society v. Freeman, supra note 1 (Jan. 30,
1979) (directing submission of economic impact statement).
105. Id.
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the S0 2 reductions called for in the decree."°6 TVA was reluctant
to include such figures, fearing that such data would be a tacit
admission that its emissions were, in fact, responsible for harm
to public health and the environment. The following language in
the Statement reveals the nature of the resulting compromise:
"Although it is impossible to put a dollar value on decreasing mortality, preventing illness, or realizing the other benefits flowing
from air pollution measures, studies that have attempted to qualify the benefits of air pollution reduction in monetary terms suggest that the benefit of this cleanup effort will appreciably surpass the costs and that, accordingly, the agreement is
deflationary."'' ° The Statement also contained detailed economic
figures in response to the court's request.
Also in March 1979 the Carter Administration moved to discount Bosworth's letter. In correspondence from Michael Egan,
Associate Attorney General, to Sanford Sagalkin, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Lands and Natural Resources, Egan
stated that the Administration fully backed the consent decree. 8
This message was intended to convince the court that the decree,
backed by the President, was in the public interest.
In April 1979 a coalition of TVA power distributors moved to
intervene in the consent decree approval process. Their opposition to the decree was encouraged by the Lt. Governor of Tennessee and large TVA industrial customers. The claims of the coalition mirrored the positions taken by TVA prior to Freeman's appointment. For example, in their motion to intervene they asserted:
The defendants have totally abandoned the meritorious defenses
set forth in their answers to the various complaints filed in this
litigation and have agreed to the imposition of a $260 million civil
penalty which is wholly unjustified in this case. Furthermore, TVA
has capitulated to the plaintiffs demands that TVA implement compliance programs which in several respects go substantially beyond
what is necessary to meet applicable emission limitations and
which will impose an unnecessary cost burden upon the residential and industrial users of TVA power.0 9
106. Quantifying the costs and benefits of SO 2 reductions has become a
sophisticated economic and epidemiological process. See, e.g., L. LAVE & E.
SESKIN, AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1977); Mendelsohn & Orcutt, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Air Pollution Dose-Response Curves, 6 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
85 (1979).
107. Statement of Economic Impacts of Consent Decree at 3, Tennessee
Thoracic Society v. Freeman, supra note 1.
108. Letter from Michael Egan to Sanford Sagalkin (Mar. 9, 1979), reprinted
in Hearings on Executive Branch Review of EnvironmentalRegulations Before the
Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 477 (1979).
109. Motion to Intervene as Defendants #1 57(c), Tennessee ThoracicSociety
v. Freeman, supra note 1 (April 18, 1979).
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These contentions were supported by arguments that the compliance program at specific plants exceeded the minimal requirements of the state SIPs.
In May 1979, over the opposition of all parties to the case, the
District Court in Nashville permitted the distributors to intervene.
It found "that the interests of the public can best be protected
and the validity of the proposed consent decree best be tested
11 The court stated
through the adversary process.""
that an evidentiary hearing on the proposed decree would be expeditiously
scheduled following discovery by the intervenors.
The intervention by the distributors illustrated the protean
character of this dispute. The distributors argued that the reason
they had failed to enter the case at an earlier stage was their confidence in TVA's judgment on air pollution policy. When they finally
received and analyzed the decree, they concluded that TVA had
capitulated to unreasonable environmental demands. EPA and the
citizens' organizations suspected, without proof, that the
distributors were encouraged by elements within TVA antagonistic
to David Freeman and the environmental principles embodied in
the decree.
On a broader level, the intervention revealed the consequences
of permitting multiple interests to participate in a complex enforcement proceeding.' One hypothesis emerged: the more diverse interests that are permitted to participate in complex bargaining
over polycentric problems," 2 the more likely it is that the strict
letter of the governing law will prevail. For example, the parties
to the original negotiations readily conceded that certain compromises contained in the decree-at the Kingston Steam Plant,
for example-were reached in the interests of settling the case
and finalizing a definite compliance program for the TVA system.
Not incidentally, the reduction in emissions beyond the minimal
requirements of the Clean Air Act was also justified in light of
the growing evidence linking total atmospheric loading in the
110. Order Granting Intervention, Tennessee Thoracic Society v. Freeman,
supra note 1 (May 25, 1979). In light of the judge's comments quoted at the outset
of this article, it is ironic that he believed that the decree could best be tested
by adversary methods. It later became clear that the judge strongly preferred
that the parties compromise their differences.
111. For thoughtful commentaries on the benefits and burdens of intervention in public law litigation, see Bell, Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and
Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Yeazell,

Intervention and the Idea of Litigation:A Commentary on the Los Angeles School
Case, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 24 (1977).
112. "Polycentricity is the property of a complex problem with a number
of subsidiary problem 'centers,' each of which is related to the others, such that
the solution to each depends on the solution to all the others." Fletcher, supra
note 5, at 645.
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eastern United States with acid rain problems in the northeast.
The distributors assailed this type of compromise as unnecessarily
burdensome to TVA consumers. Had the court upheld the
distributors' objections, major aspects of the decree would have
been eviscerated, even though these provisions could readily be
justified as promoting the national interest both in reducing total
atmospheric loading of SO 2 and encouraging experimentation with
innovative pollution control technology.
The role of the court in deciding whether to permit intervention and to ultimately approve the decree was essentially political.
This characteristic of public law litigation has been noted by commentators of this modern form of advocacy:
The enormity and complexity of such an undertaking [the use
of litigation as an instrument for systemic organizational change]
have created unprecedented pressures on judges to abandon their
historical positions as neutral arbiters and to assume the
manipulative role of powerbrokers. The conventions of litigation
present the judge with many opportunities to influence allocation
of bargaining advantages among the parties before him. Decisions
he makes-the specificity of his orders, his choice of procedures
for planning remedies, which parties he allows or orders to be
joined- unavoidably have an impact on the structure and the
agenda and thus the outcome of subsequent political games."'
The legitimacy of this role in the context of the present dispute
is open to question.
It took a leap of faith for the court to subject the consent decree
to outside challenge prior to receiving any evidence, other than
the allegations of the distributors. It would have been eminently
correct for the court to have found that a decree negotiated in
good faith (there were never any claims of impropriety) by representatives of TVA, EPA, the states (excluding Tennessee), and
citizens' organizations furthered the public interest, the main standard the court applied in reviewing the decree."' In rejecting this
compromise, the court apparently believed that the views urged
by the distributors -views consistent with corporate criticism of
regulation and environmental policy-were not given adequate
weight in the negotiations and, therefore, ought to be publicly
heard. On another level, the court could have felt that TVA consumers should not have to pay for benefits that would accrue out113. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:SuperintendingStructural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 106 (1979).
114. The jurisprudence of public law consent decrees deserves further
scholarly attention. The manageability of the public interest standard, for example, is questionable. Courts have only begun to deepen their analysis of these
transformative documents. See, e.g., Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541
(6th Cir. 1982).
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side the Valley. Whatever the court's motivations, the permission
given the distributors to participate was bottomed on a misplaced
faith in pluralism. In the end, as in most pluralist political processes, the most powerful interests prevailed.11 5
VII.

THE AFTERMATH

The distributors conducted extensive discovery during the summer of 1979, deposing David Freeman, Richard Freeman, and key
TVA and EPA staff members. Then in August 1979 TVA notified
EPA, the states, and the citizens' organizations that a miscalculation in modeling at Cumberland had been discovered. This
miscalculation showed that the scrubbers that were to be constructed at Cumberland in anticipation of meeting secondary ambient air quality standards and allowing future industrial growth
were unncessary. Consequently, the original parties had to decide
how to handle the $260 million noncompliance penalty, a penalty
the court had seriously questioned at a discovery hearing in July
1979. Spurred by these interests, the parties decided to abandon
their request for penalties in the hope that the court would approve the decree. The court, however, took no action, although
the distributors publicly took credit for this development.
The Alabama case, which had been mostly dormant, never attracted much attention. Curiously, the distributors did not intervene
in Birmingham, even though certain of their objections covered
the Alabama decree as well."' In October 1979 the court scheduled
a hearing on the status of the decree. Prior to the hearing, the
Assistant Alabama Attorney General who had been representing
the state notified the parties that the newly elected Attorney
General had in principle withdrawn the state's support of the
decree.
At the hearing, counsel for the citizens' organizations, EPA,
and TVA encouraged the court to enter the decree despite the
refusal of the new Alabama Attorney General to join in their request. After an explanation of the progress toward compliance that
had been made under the decree in Alabama, the Judge approved
the settlement. He noted that the former Alabama Attorney
General had participated fully in the negotiations and had signed
the decree and assured the representative from Alabama that his

115. Cf. J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION
IN APPALACHIA (1980); G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

(1966); C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1959).
116. The distributors' objections to the structural aspects of the
settlement -penalties for noncompliance and the implementation committeewere common to both decrees.

1982]

PUBLIC LAW ADVOCACY

879

entry of the decree should in no way reflect on the new Attorney
General.
Following the final resolution in Alabama, the Nashville case
languished for almost another year. During the interim, in January
1980, Senator Sasser, based on a General Accounting Office investigation he had requested," 7 questioned TVA's decision to implement the decree before final approval and to continue construction at Paradise in light of possible modeling errors at that plant.
He concluded:
In review, I remain concerned that TVA may have cutback into
a settlement which exceeds the requirements of the Clean Air
Act and EPA regulations .... I am sure that TVA management
will want to trim system costs wherever possible before recommending any new rate increases which must be paid. by the
residents and businesses of the Valley.' 8
This parochial, short-term perspective was also echoed by Robert
Clement, Jr., who was appointed by President Carter in 1979 to
fill the third vacancy on the Board.
As this criticism from Sasser and Clement was being aired,
Tennessee Lt. Governor John Wilder sought to unravel the settlement by attempting to convince Kentucky political officialsincluding Kentucky Governor Julian Carroll-that the Paradise
emission limit in the decree was too strict."9 Kentucky officials
rejected this unprecedented lobbying, relying on information supplied to them by the Kentucky air pollution staff and attorneys
indicating that the emission limit was properly determined. They
also argued that, even if too strict, the emission limit was necessary
to leave room for future industrial growth in the counties surrounding Paradise.
Finally in the late summer of 1980, another unanticipated
development occurred in the case. TVA announced that new
forecasting data showed that the demand for electricity from the
Johnsonville Plant, where an innovative scrubbing system was to
be constructed, would drop sufficiently in the future to justify curtailment of electricity production at the plant. This meant that
it would be significantly less costly for TVA to comply with the
applicable emission limit with low sulfur coal. This revelation oddly
seemed to confirm the claims of the distributors. After conferring
about their options, EPA and the citizens' organizations agreed
that based on the changed circumstances, the construction of the
117. Report from J. Dexter Peach, Director, Energy and Minerals Division,
General Accounting Office to Senator James Sasser (Jan. 14, 1980).
118. Letter from Senator James Sasser to S. David Freeman at 2-3 (Jan.
24, 1980).
119. Knoxville Journal, Feb. 12, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
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scrubbers was presently unnecessary. They accepted the new compliance plan for Johnsonville and informed the court of this action.
In December 1980 a status conference on the decree was held
in Nashville. At that conference, it was clear that the distributors
believed that their claims had been vindicated, and they voiced
only half-hearted objections to the rest of the decree. Weeks later,
the court signed the settlement, retaining jurisdiction over its
implementation.
The entry of the decree signaled the beginning of the work
of the Implementation Committee. 120 Each plaintiff was able to appoint a representative to this monitoring body. Because a fair voting
process was infeasible, it was agreed that the group would have
to strive toward consensus. Any irreconcilable disputes would be
taken to the court.
In its nearly two years of existence, the Committee has functioned remarkably smoothly. TVA has faithfully supplied all requested data and has attempted to document thoroughly all deviations from the terms of the decree (mainly missed construction
deadlines). In turn, the members of the Implementation Committee have provided TVA with their informed opinions regarding
air pollution policy.
In July 1981 the dispute almost came full circle. At that time
TVA sent a report to Senator Robert Stafford, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, on the air
compliance program in response to the Committee's favorable comments about the program during the March 1981 TVA oversight
hearings. 1 ' Making minor recommendations for procedural changes,
the report endorsed the essential structure of the Clean Air Act
at a time the Act was under heavy criticism by numerous industrial
groups whose goal was substantial legislative modifications. The
TVA report concluded:
Although TVA thinks that the administration of the act can
be improved, TVA wishes to emphasize that regulation of air quality is a necessary role for the Federal Government. Air quality
knows no state or even regional boundaries. The inevitable conflicts between states over regional air quality impacts makes
Federal control or oversight essential to economic prosperity and
the conservation of clean air."2
120. Monitoring committees to assist courts in implementing complex
remedies are by now standard fare in public law litigation. See Special Project,
supra note 5, at 826-37. There was even precedent for an "implementation committee." United States v. United States Steel Corp., 5 Empl. Pract. Dec. 8619
(1973).
121. Tennessee Valley Authority Oversight:HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
122. Letter and Report from C. H. Dean, Jr., Chairman, TVA to Senator
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CONCLUSION

No account of litigation as multitextured as the TVA air pollution conflict can capture all the nuances and subtleties of strategies
and relationships that might be explored. Rich accounts of complex advocacy will necessarily sound like political novels, with all
the intrigue and surprises characteristic of that genre. At best,
this piece has provided glimpses into the political economy of this
byzantine struggle. It has tried to make sense of a dynamic event
from the vantage of a participant-observer and to examine notions
about the legal, political, and interpersonal processes of public law
enforcement and institutional reform. A few tentative conclusions
are in order.
Though they have been criticized for providing a subsidized
vehicle for private interest groups -allegedly masquerading in the
public interest-to challenge government policy,123 citizens' suits
play an extremely important role in the policymaking and implementation process. In the TVA conflict the citizens' suit provision of
the Clean Air Act gave Valley organizations an unparallelled forum
in which to enforce the public interest already defined by Congress. In one fell swoop the suits compelled TVA to incorporate
diverse points of view into the agency's decisionmaking on air pollution controls. The litigation also contributed to halting the successful tactics of political obstructionism employed by TVA and
its allies against EPA.
Throughout the controversy, the citizens' organizations, EPA,
and the states were confronted with TVA's claims that it was in
the best position to define the public interest. In making this claim,
the agency, portraying itself as a technocratic institution removed
from the crucible of interest group pressures, implicitly argued
that it should have the unilateral power to make national policy. 24
At the same time, the agency was constantly confronting its
unrealized historical aspirations of exemplifying an accountable
regional entity that accurately registered the common interests
of the Valley.' 25 This tension between autonomy and control, as
Stafford (July 24, 1981) reprinted in 4 Impact: TVA Natural Resources and the
Environment (Nov. 1981).
123. See Vogel, The Public Interest Movement and the American Reform Tradition, 95 POL. ScI. Q. 607 (1980).
124. In recent years, some political theorists have advocated giving institutions this kind of power. See, e.g., Huntington, The United States, in THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRACY 59-118 (1975). Others have warned of the dangers of such unaccountable entities. See, e.g., Wolin, The American Pluralist Conception of Politics, in
ETHICS IN HARD TIMES 217-60 (1981).

125. Since its creation, TVA has always claimed to promote what one commentator has called a "unitary democracy," one based on decentralized participation and control. See J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 3-35 (1980).
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Robert Dahl recently called it, 2' is common to modern democratic
government. The tension will undoubtedly continue to plague TVA
as it confronts new issues that, like air pollution, cut across political
boundaries, generations, and common interests.
No matter how TVA chooses to resolve this tension, its history
of institutional autonomy places special burdens on the agency to
ensure that its policy decisions are openly and fairly reached. In
this controversy, decisionmaking at the agency went awry. Through
a closed process of decisionmaking that was insensitive to national
policies, the agency assumed the role of an ideological advocate
for a particular anti-regulatory position. 2 ' In so doing, it forfeited
its claim to insulation from outside review.
If TVA is to justify the trust placed in it by its founders, it
is essential that the agency abandon its technocratic rhetoric and
strive to identify the values and interests that its policies promote.'2 8
It must also develop creative mechanisms for accountability -much
like the Implementation Committee-if it expects its substantive
decisions to be trusted.129 Such participatory experiments would
reduce the modern-day dissonance between the agency's democratic
rhetoric and its actions. 3 °
See R. DAHL, DILEMMA OF PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CON(1982).
127. Other commentators would reach a different conclusion. They would
argue that the citizens' organizations were, in fact, "sectarian" ideologues,
unrepresentative of and unaccountable to any real constituency. See, e.g., M.
DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF
TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS passim (1982).
128. Laurence Tribe has perceptively criticized government's failure to incorporate a more transcendent conception of community and values into its instrumental decisionmaking structures. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?,
2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972); Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundationsfor Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). Because of its
regional focus, TVA is uniquely situated among federal institutions to experiment with methods that, though perhaps not strictly cost-effective, appeal to
grander, shared ideals. TVA's policies toward farmland, urban growth, and
wilderness preservation are logical starting places. Such proposals, though they
might strain the agency's political support, would reinvest in TVA much of the
moral support lost by the agency in recent years. The balance between tilting
at windmills and effective execution of TVA's responsibilities is concededly difficult; but the agency would seem to have little to lose.
129. See D. YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY
AND EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 171-77 (1982).
130. It is vital that such participatory mechanisms not be dominated by
elite interests in the Valley, such as the distributor organizations. This is a dilemma
TVA has faced for many years. "The alternative to the grass-roots approach is
not less participation by citizens: it is, on the contrary, more meaningful
participation- participation not through kept committees or through organizations which themselves stand in the relation of manipulator to mass, but through
the play of political pressure from a variety of publics upon a government which
has power commensurate with its tasks .... The wider the issue, the wider must
126.
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The controversy also underscores the blurring of public and
private power in public law litigation. In an odd reversal of roles,
TVA became the private interest working for its perspective of
the local good, while the citizens' organizations assumed a distinctly
national role. The distributors, too, wielded extensive power,
although much of it was derived from their close association with
TVA. The role of the court in this dispute raises similarly difficult
questions. 3' How extensively was the court influenced by undefined
political pressures? How can a court be adequately guided by standards as amorphous as the public interest? How can we expect
judges to comprehend the mass of technical detail that undergrids
cases like this?
Public advocacy was employed in this case to transform an institution that offended public norms. Multiple forums were used
by the advocates to further their policy ends. Finally, the litigation forced TVA to reassess its mission and to look to the future
rather than the past.'32 The consent decree as originally negotiated
represented "an affirmative vision of social function that was both
ideal and concrete."' 33 If public advocacy has any value, it is to
stimulate public disclosure and action about the nature and course
of public institutions like TVA. It is to be hoped that this lesson
will not be soon forgotten by the participants in this particular
conflict.
be the public that decides it ......
See also CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN

Tugwell & Banfield, supra note 44, at 55.

AMERICA (S. Langton ed. 1978); P. NONET & P.
SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 101-03

(1978). There is evidence that the agency is trying to improve its participatory
schemes. TVA, Citizen Participation: A Case in Point (1982) (describing the process of eliciting public participation in TVA's decisions to cancel and defer nuclear
reactors).
131. On the role of leadership in shaping institutional responses to problems,
see P. SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1957); R. TUCKER, POLITICS AS LEADERSHIP (1981). A sensitive examination

of TVA leadership is Hargrovc, The Task of Leadership: The Board Chairmen
of the TVA, in E. Hargrove, supra note 28.
132. Public advocacy in the TVA case also served a "critical and demystifying" function. "Public advocacy proponents and related reformers have brought
to light aspects of the regulatory process that rarely have been discussed except
in limited circles. The critics have demonstrated the contradiction between our
political ideals and the operation of the administrative process." Trubek, supra
note 77, at 491. Another recent TVA case, in which the author was lead counsel,
well illustrates this function of public advocacy. In Tennessee Valley Energy Coalition v. TVA, No. 81-1069 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 1981) (motion for summary judgment
pending) a low-income consumer organization challenged TVA's policy of charging current consumers the substantial interest costs on nuclear plants then under
construction. The suit was the first major attempt to penetrate TVA's complicated
financial structure, the key to TVA's power program. Until this case, the public
knew little about the methods TVA used to finance its power system. See Wirtz,
TVA, The Courts, and Power Rates, within this Symposium.
133. L. Sargentich, supra note 80, at 80.

